influential magazines such as The Economist (13-19.5.2000) run cover stories on ' Africa: The Hopeless Continent ', the perilous condition of much of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is highlighted.
1 Of course, any generalisation about all 48 states of SSA will always have important exceptions (Englebert 2000; Mkandawire 2001 ). Countries as diverse as Senegal, Botswana, Mauritius and most notably the ' new' South Africa have operated stable, multiparty democracies since independence and the end of apartheid respectively, and their economies have also experienced growth.
2 Indeed, Botswana and Mauritius are models of African 'democratic developmental states' (Mkandawire 2001: 310) . This said, at least since the early 1980s much of the region has declined both absolutely and relative to the rest of the global periphery. This decline is multifaceted and well documented (e.g. Arrighi 2002; Callaghy & Ravenhill 1993 ; Kennedy 1999; Sandbrook 1985 ; Whitaker 1988; World Bank 1989 . The reasons for SSA's crisis are however hotly disputed.
As Arrighi (2002) notes, explanations of the African tragedy tend to emphasise either factors external to Africa such as declining terms of trade and Cold War interventions, or factors internal to weak African states themselves such as authoritarian rule and corruption, as the reasons for widespread decline and decay. It is not the purpose of this article to engage this important debate, since a complex mix of both external and internal structures and agents are evidently involved. Among the most important internal causes, however, are various forms of political instability (PI) and mal-governance, which may themselves have external causes.
3
A major, but not the only manifestation of domestic PI in SSA is the military coup d'état, of which there have been 80 along with 108 failed coup attempts by elements of the military and related security services during the 46 years examined in this article (see Appendix A for a chronological list of these 188 events). Military rule is by definition authoritarian and is often very corrupt -as Major-General Ibrahim Babangida's rule from 1985 to 1993 in Nigeria illustrates (see Diamond 1995) -and the historical record shows that military rulers 'govern' no better than elected civilians in Africa, and often much worse -witness Babangida, Idi Amin, JeanBedel Bokassa and Sani Abacha.
Because African militaries in power often fail to create political order, they are part of the problem, not its answer (Huntington 1968) . As Decalo (1976 : 14-5) writes :
many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organisational model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal grievances. One direct corollary is that when the military assumes power it is frequently not able to provide an efficient, nationally oriented and stable administration.
These facts led Robin Luckham (1994: 52) in his important survey of the literature and issues to conclude that : ' a brutally cynical view would be that there has been only one general pattern. So far neither military nor civilian governments have been able to resolve the development crises facing African states. ' That PI in the form of military-led coups, attempted coups and coup plots harms the economic performance of countries experiencing them is close to conventional wisdom. Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets (1996 : 451) has written: ' Clearly some minimum political stability is necessary if members of the economic society are to plan ahead and be assured of a relatively stable relation between their contribution to economic activity and their reward. ' Regarding Africa, Fosu's (1992 Fosu's ( , 2001 Fosu's ( , 2002a Fosu's ( , 2002b sophisticated econometric studies have shown that couprelated events had a clear impact on yearly growth in GDP for 31 SSA states during the period 1960-86, reducing the rate of growth by as much as one-third of the observed average. Military-led PI also had a negative impact on the rate of improvement in human development (life expectancy+literacy) between 1970 and 1985 for a slightly reduced sample of 29 African states (Fosu 2002b : 14-16) .
For Fosu (2002b: 11) and Deger (1986) , the economically distorting rentseeking behaviour of African militaries and their elite constituencies explains the negative impact of military-led PI and military rule on economic growth and human development. 4 Whether it is the military's diversion of drought relief funds in Mali (Wolpin 1980) or the establishment by the Sudanese military of their own trading, transport and industrial ventures, enabling them to generate independent revenue and engage in corruption (Bienen & Moore 1987; Luckham 1994 : 39, 51) , African militaries often become an ' armed party ' (Luckham 1994: 44) or ' partis militaires ' (Rouquié 1981) , engaged in personal and corporate enrichment and the political representation of their corporatist interests.
Moreover, the military coup is today almost exclusively an African phenomenon. Once frequent and widespread in the global South, since the mid-1980s successful military coups d'état have become relatively rare in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia; whereas between 1985 and 2001 SSA experienced 21 successful coups and 41 failed coup attempts. 5 The pervasiveness of African military coups and their anti-developmental consequences justify a descriptive analysis of their frequency, trends and geographical distribution.
M I L I T A R Y C O U P S D'É T A T
A coup d'état involves the sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group -in contrast to ' revolutions' achieved by large numbers of people working for basic social, economic and political change. Thus, a coup is a change in power from the top that always results in the abrupt replacement of leading government personnel, but may or may not alter a state's fundamental social and economic policies or entail a significant redistribution of power among political groups. The classic analysis of coups and resulting military rule is by Finer (1988) .
When coups d'état became frequent and widespread in SSA during the second half of the 1960s, scholars began to produce an impressive array of single-case studies. Those published in this Journal alone include: Bennett (1975) , Fischer (1969) , Higgott & Fuglestad (1975) , Lewis (1972) , Lofchie (1972), and Southall (1975) . Also appearing were more comparative, qualitative studies of the role of the military in African politics; those published in this Journal include Decalo (1973) , O'Connell (1967) , and Welch (1967 Welch ( , 1972 Welch ( , 1975 . Research of this genre continues (e.g. Decalo 1989 ; Ihonvbere 1996) and is very useful, as detailed case histories (including those of failed coups, as in Birmingham 1978; Clapham 1968 ; Kebschull 1994) can provide a richness of detail and nuance impossible in comparative and quantitative studies.
The systematic and quantitative study of African coups d'état was pioneered by Morrison & Stevenson (1971) and most impressively advanced in their collaborative effort with others published in 1972 as Black Africa: a comparative handbook (Morrison et al. 1972) . In this book the authors produced an index of 'elite instability' for 32 SSA states from independence until December 1969, including clear operational definitions of successful coups, attempted coups and coup plots (1972: 128) . In their country chapters (1972 : 181-382) they provided capsule descriptions of all the coups and attempted coups they identified, as well as yearly frequency counts of all three types of event.
6 Their method of ' event data-making ' made it possible for others to posit complex models of the causes of African coups d'état, and test them with sophisticated statistical methods (e.g. Jackman 1978) .
Building upon this early work, and modifying Morrison et al.'s definitions to include only events involving the military, police and/or security services, we assembled an event data of set of military coups d'état, attempted coups and reported coup plots for all 45 independent SSA states for the period from 1 January 1956 to 31 December 1985 (McGowan & Johnson 1984 , 1986 . Because of these articles and our willingness to share our data, others were able to investigate a wide array of theoretical explanations of military-led PI in Africa, using a variety of statistical techniques ( Jenkins & Kposowa 1990 , 1992 Kposowa & Jenkins 1993; Lunde 1991) , and to explore the impact of PI on such issues as economic growth, human development and arms transfers (Fosu 1992 (Fosu , 2002a (Fosu , 2002b Wang 1998) .
In this article we present and analyse an extended event data set covering all 48 independent sub-Saharan African states for the 46-year period from 1 January 1956 to 31 December 2001.
7 Our original conception of African coups was influenced by Ruth First's (1970 : 18) pioneering analysis when she wrote: 'the coup d'état can pre-empt revolution, or lead to it. It can install a military, or an alternative civilian government. It can maintain, or change, social policy. In its essence the coup is a lightning action at the top, in which violence is the ultimate determinant, even if it is not used.' As in earlier studies (McGowan & Johnson 1984 : 634-6, 1986 , our focus here is on events in which existing regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of a relatively small group, in which members of the military, police or security forces of the state play a key role, either on their own or in conjunction with civilian elites such as civil servants, politicians and monarchs. Consistent with First (1970) , the scope of change in any regime resulting from a successful intervention can vary from the mere removal of the head-of-state (including his assassination), to the wholesale displacement of leaders and officials by the coup perpetrators, or a dissolution of previously existing constitutional relationships such as the suspension of the constitution, closing legislatures and banning political parties. The stated aims of the coup-makers can vary from reaction to revolution. Likewise, the degree of violence involved can range from none, so-called ' bloodless coups', to pronounced.
For the purposes of this study, the displacements of government personnel or constitutional relationships lasting at least one week have been classified as ' successful coups d'état'. Falling below this threshold, 'failed coups' are defined as those which involved either (i) displacements lasting less than seven days, or (ii) attempted assassinations and arrests of some members of the existing regime, or (iii) the mobilisation of the military, police, or security forces explicitly aimed at a government take-over.
Plots are another form of extra-legal military involvement in African politics. Outsiders generally learn of their existence from government announcements that a plot has been uncovered, prior to it becoming a visible public event. This immediately raises the question whether the various reported plots did in fact exist, or whether they were manufactured by the regime as a justification for eliminating political opponents. A number of plots may also have been hatched and later dropped for some reason without the government knowing about them, much less exposing their existence (on the problems of identifying plots and distinguishing them from failed coups see Kebschull 1994: 567-8) .
In the course of our research we recorded only those ' coup plots' reported in at least two independent news sources. By these standards it was alleged in 139 instances that a plot had been uncovered. It is not possible to guarantee that in all instances these were ' actual ' as opposed to 'manufactured ' ; nor can we claim that no more have occurred in the 48 SSA states studied. Nonetheless, reported plots are important data, indicating military involvement in politics and, for that reason, worth examining with these caveats in mind. Moreover, Fosu (2001: 293) has demonstrated that when it comes to explaining differences in the rates of economic growth in SSA, an index including coup plots along with coups and failed coup attempts is a statistically more powerful measure of African PI than any of the three types of events alone.
In Appendix B we report examples from our new data set of coups, failed coups and coup plots from Côte d'Ivoire in the period 1991 to 2000. As can be seen from these examples, each of the 327 events in our data file includes seven items of information: (1) the state where the event happened ; (2) the type of event ; (3) the date of the event; (4) a description of the event ; (5) a roster of known or alleged participants; (6) the apparent and reported causes of the event; and (7) the sources from which the information was gathered.
This approach to ' event data-making' takes a middle ground between narrative case studies and simple quantitative counts of events including only the type of event and its date (e.g. Lunde 1991 : 30-1; Wang 1996 Wang , 1998 . While in no way as detailed as a case study of a particular coup, our event descriptions are narrative texts that can be analysed via computer-assisted content analysis, for example, in an effort to identify causes of PI in Africa. On the other hand, if one wants to study the rate of coup behaviour over time via event history analysis, as advocated by Lunde (1991) , Appendix A provides the exact dates of all failed and successful coups by country over our 46-year time period.
Information on each event was gathered from a variety of sources. The starting point was our existing data file for the period 1956 -85 (McGowan 1986 . All events in this file were double-checked against the events reported in the second edition of Black Africa : a comparative handbook (Morrison et al. 1989 : 357-716) for the years 1956-79, and the list of failed and successful coups given by Lunde (1991: 30-1) for the 1955-85 period. New events for the period 1986-2001 were identified and written up using the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe electronic archive and printed sources such as The New York Times Index and Africa Research Bulletin. The Lexis-Nexis archive is ideal for our purposes, as it stores news stories from international wire services, major Western newspapers, and the African press. Its coverage of news sources is similar to Africa Research Bulletin's, but much easier to access because of its computer-based interactive format. For the years 1986-90 we checked our new events against Wang's (1996) data set that extended our original file for these five years. 8 We also compared all our successful coup events with Esterhuysen's (2002: 72-85 ) list of government changes in all African countries from independence to the end of 2001.
As stated, no event was included in our file unless it was reported in at least two independent sources. 9 We are confident that all 327 events we have identified did occur. Regarding both failed and successful coups by the military, which are highly newsworthy events, we believe that we have identified all that have occurred for our 48 states during our 46-year time period. A comparison of Appendix A with the lists of coups and coup attempts in Morrison et al. (1989) , Lunde (1991 : 30-1) and Wang (1998) , shows a very high degree of agreement for the years 1956-90. Regarding reported coup plots, we are certain that the 139 we have identified actually did happen, but others may have occurred without being reported in our sources. September 2002 , the overall picture is even worse. Forty-one out of 48 SSA states (85 . 4%) have had either coups or failed coup attempts. Only six countries have been completely free of military intervention events; but three of them (Namibia, Eritrea and South Africa) only became independent or majority-ruled in the 1990s, and therefore have not had much time to prove they are immune from this form of PI. Thus, only the multiparty democracies of Botswana, Cape Verde and Mauritius have both been independent for more than 25 years and entirely free of the coup virus.
Second, with the exception of the Seychelles, all the states that experienced the 80 coups we have recorded also saw failed coups and coup plots. Thus, these three types of military intervention events are part of a larger military PI syndrome within African states. The product-moment correlations among the three types of events are: coups with failed coups, r=0 . 576; coups with plots, r=0 . 541 ; and failed coups with plots, r=0 . 555 (all significant at the p<0 . 001 level when N=48). Thus, while some researchers will prefer to study event counts and their timing (see Appendix A), the interrelatedness of the three event types justifies calculating the Total Military Intervention Scores (TMIS) in Table 1 .
Creating TMIS is also justified by Luckham's (1994: 34) summary of the findings of previous statistical research on African coups: ' In general the political impact of plots, coup attempts and coups has been additive. Coups have been more likely in states where major plots and coup attempts have already occurred, and still more likely in states which have already experienced successful coups and military government.' Weights were assigned to each type of event (coup=5, failed coup=3 and coup plot=1), with TMIS being the sum of these weighted events for each SSA state (cf. Jackman 1978; McGowan & Johnson 1984; Morrison et al. 1989) . As the actual frequencies of each type of event for each state are given in Appendix C, others are free to create different weighting schemes according to their theoretical preferences.
Because states like Sudan, Ghana and Uganda have such high TMIS values, its distribution is skewed with a mean value of 18 . 0 and a lower median value of 13 . 5. The first 18 states in Appendix C, from Sudan to Guinea, recorded scores above the average TMIS value and were ' praetorian' states during many of their post-colonial years. Five of these were British colonies, nine were French colonies, and two were Belgian, while Ethiopia and Liberia were never European colonies. This suggests that features common to weak African states themselves, such as the nature of civil-military relations and the character of African militaries (Decalo 1989) , rather than factors associated with their colonial heritage, are the source of much coup-driven PI in SSA.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that with the exception of Comoros, all 18 praetorian states achieved their independence before 1963. Only Comoros and Guinea-Bissau rank above the median TMIS value of 13 . 5 and also became independent more than a decade after 1963, whereas 16 states ranking below the median value became independent or majority-ruled after that year. On average, the longer a SSA state has been independent, the more TMIS it has accumulated. When TMIS is regressed on the number of years an African state has been independent, the resulting equation is: TMIS=x17 . 1+0 . 97 Years Independent, adjusted R 2 =25 . 7%.
10 As a descriptive statistic, this says that for every year of independence, the typical SSA post-colonial state has experienced one additional TMIS point. Of course, this does not explain the variation in TMIS between these states, but it does indicate that as the years pass weak post-colonial African states tend to accumulate more military-led PI.
There are many reasons for staging a coup in Africa. Among the most important is the rent-seeking behaviour made possible by control of the state (Bayart 1993) . Of course, staging a coup is a risky business and only rational if there is a good chance of success, so that rent seeking can be undertaken. We can therefore define a ' coup success rate ' as the probability of being successful once an attempt is started (i.e. successful coups divided by successful coups+failed coups). In Appendix C the success rate is 42 . 6% (80/80+108), indicating that there has been a better than 40% chance of gaining power when launching a coup since the first successful coup in the Sudan in November 1958.
Overtime the success rate has varied around this overall average rate. When calculated by 5-year periods (see Table 2 ), success rates have been as high as 74% and as low as 19% . In eight of the nine periods the rate of success was greater than one in three, apparently sufficient to tempt elements in African militaries to initiate coup attempts as they evaluated their chances vis-à-vis other militaries' successes and failures.
Finally, when we compare Appendix A and Appendix C, we find that 89 (47 . 3%) of the 188 coups and failed coups were against an existing military regime that itself had come to power in a coup. This shows the extent of factionalism and rivalry in African militaries once they have accomplished a successful coup d'état (Lunde 1991: 17) . This is particularly true of the 18 praetorian states with above average TMIS. Eleven of Sudan's 15 failed coups and successful coups were against existing military regimes, as were 7 of Ghana's 11, and 8 of Uganda's 13. In extreme cases of military factionalism, this and other processes can result in a collapsed state, civil wars and warlordism as in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Reno 1998) .
The 46 years examined in this article can be divided into two periods of 24 and 22 years respectively : 1956 to 1979 and 1980 to 2001. By the end of 1979 all of SSA was independent and majority ruled except for Zimbabwe, Namibia, Eritrea and South Africa. While there was variation, African economies performed reasonably well up to the end of the 1970s (Mkandawire 2001). After 1979 the knock-on effects of the OPEC oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979 and the collapse of commodity prices in the mid-1980s took effect and SSA entered its post-1980 period of marginalisation and crisis. In order to show coup frequencies in these two different time periods we have created Appendices D and E.
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While countries change their rank in these two appendices, as one would expect, the differences in average coup behaviour are much less than one might anticipate given the democratisation trend that began in SSA around 1990 as part of a global 'third wave ' of democratic transitions (Huntington 1991 Three conclusions follow from this evidence. First, once begun in 1958, military-led PI has remained pervasive over time in SSA. Second, African regimes were better able to survive coup attempts in the second period than in the first, perhaps because they were independent longer and their political systems had become more institutionalised (Huntington 1968) or because they had learned techniques to insulate themselves from successful coups (Lunde 1991: 25) . Third, the differences in macroeconomic conditions and performance between the two periods, with the first being much better than the second, do not appear to have affected the frequency of coup behaviour.
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Another politically significant turning point occurred at the end of the 1980s. The Berlin Wall and then European Communism collapsed between November 1989 and the end of 1991, thus ending the Cold War. In 1990 in Africa the ' second wave of independence' began with democratisation in Benin and the beginning of the negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa. With democratisation and the end of Cold War interventions, the political environment in SSA in the 1990s was dramatically different from the earlier post-colonial decades. Much of the recent literature on African politics has examined these hopeful trends. Unfortunately, when it comes to military interventions, the 1990s are an instance of plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. During the 12 years 1990 to 2001 there were 50 attempted coups, of which 13 (26%) were successful.
These 50 events represent 26% of all coup behaviour recorded in this study. The preceding 12 years, 1978 to 1989 saw 54 attempted coups, of which 26 (48%) were successful. These 54 events are 28 . 7% of all coup behaviour reported here. Again, the 1990s saw a much lower rate of success in comparison to earlier years, but no significant reduction in the African military's propensity to launch coup attempts. New, weakly institutionalised democratic governments are as apt to suffer from the coup virus as are weak one-party and military regimes.
In Table 1 Five states (Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Somalia and Zaire/ DRC) moved from above average TMIS to below average in 1980-2001. With the exception of Benin, the other four states experienced extensive communal violence and civil war at various times in the period. In the case of Somalia, after dictator Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991 having lost a civil war, there has been no central government against which to attempt a coup d'état. Madagascar experienced a coup, two failed coups and a coup plot before 1980 and therefore was in the above average TMIS group, but saw no subsequent intervention behaviour to the end of 2001. The authoritarian rule of President Didier Ratsiraka (a former naval officer) and the military's loyalty to his regime brought this about.
Nine states from Chad to Malawi had below average TMIS levels in both time periods. Nevertheless, Chad, Mali, Rwanda and Swaziland had coups in the first period and Mali had a second coup in March 1991. Of these nine states only Malawi has never seen a coup or attempted coup. Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Swaziland and Tanzania saw no intervention events after January 1990 (see Table 3 ), although Rwanda has become today's paradigm of civil war and communal violence since the genocide of 1994.
Three states (Cameroon, Djibouti and São Tomé & Principe) shifted from no TMIS in the first period to below average in 1980-2001, because each experienced an attempted coup in 1984, 1991 and 1995 respectively (Cameroon also had a coup plot). Still, none have so far seen a successful coup and Cameroon has been free of military intervention activity since January 1990.
Three states (Angola, Senegal and Seychelles) moved from the below average TMIS category from their independence to 1979 into the group of no TMIS between 1980 and 2001. The MPLA regime in Angola was, of course, engaged in a bitter civil war with Savimbi's UNITA throughout these years. In the case of the Seychelles, Albert René, who came to power in a coup in 1977, democratised the political system in the 1990s. Senegal, which saw a failed coup in 1962 soon after independence, has solidified its record as a multiparty democracy, particularly when opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade won a hotly contested election in March 2000.
Thus, only the three long-standing multiparty democracies of Botswana, Cape Verde and Mauritius were in the no TMIS category from their independence until the end of 2001. Cape Verde, independent in 1975, democratised in 1990 and the opposition won the first genuinely democratic elections in 1991. Botswana has operated a multiparty democracy since independence in 1966, but the Botswana Democratic Party has never lost an election. Mauritius, on the other hand, has seven different political parties and incumbent prime ministers have been defeated three times since independence in 1968 (1982, 1995, 2000) . Half the states in Table 1 (22) did not change categories in the second half of our 46 year time span: ten stayed above average TMIS, nine stayed below average and only three were continuously without TMIS of any kind. Thirteen states saw their TMIS grouping increase in the second period and nine decreased. Hence, with the exception of a lower success rate, the 1980s and 1990s were little different from the 1960s and 1970s for military involvement in the politics of particular African states.
T R E N D S O V E R T I M E
Given our discussion of Appendices C and D and Table 1 , it should come as no surprise that coup behaviour in SSA exhibits no clear increasing or decreasing trend over all 46 years studied here. In Table 2 we have plotted the frequency of successful and failed coups by nine, five-year periods.
14 Coup behaviour reached a peak during the fifteen-year period 1971-85, although 1966-70 saw the most successful coups with 17. The second half of the 1980s saw only 13 coups and failed coups, but that was also true of the first half of the 1960s. While 1991 to 2001 may have been years of democratisation in Africa, they nevertheless saw 47 coup attempts of which 13 were successful. In comparison, the period 1971 to 1980 saw 57 attempted coups with 27 being successful, while 1981 to 1990 was similar to the 1990s with 42 attempts of which 15 were successful (see also Appendix A).
Indeed, since the first coup in the Sudan in November 1958 there has not been a single year through 2001 without coup activity by African militaries.
15 During the 44 years between 1958 and 2001, only ten years did not see a successful coup d'état somewhere in SSA -1959 SSA - , 1961 SSA - , 1962 SSA - , 1964 SSA - , 1970 SSA - , 1988 SSA - , 1990 SSA - , 1995 SSA - , 1998 and 2000 -but all of these coup-free years saw from one to three failed coup attempts. The peak years of coup activity were 1991 with two successful coups and eight failed coup attempts, and 1966 with one failed coup and a remarkable eight successful coups, three more than 1980 which had five coups d'état.
In Figure 1 we have plotted annual TMIS and the number of independent SSA states for each year. Because TMIS includes coup plots as well as failed and successful coups, the extent of PI in Africa is clearly evident. The annual average value of TMIS across these 46 years is 18 . 8, with a standard deviation of 10 . 6. Only in 1966 with a TMIS value of 47 was the index more than two standard deviations above average. In most years, 31, TMIS varied within one standard deviation of its average : 8 . 2 to 29 . 4. The following years recorded TMIS of 30 or more : 1966, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1985 and 1991 . These were years of above average coup behaviour and cluster in the middle of our time-span when most SSA states had achieved independence. Years with TMIS of 8 or less were 1956, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1998 . Except for 1998, these were years at the beginning of our study period when there were few independent SSA states, or immediately after 1960 when the number of independent states jumped from five to 22 (see Lunde 1991) .
In contrast to the co-variation of intervention events within African states discussed above, these events do not co-vary over time. The productmoment correlations across our 46 years are : coups with failed coups, r= x0 . 065 ; coups with plots, r=0 . 240 ; and failed coups with plots, r=0 . 173, none of which are significant at the p<0 . 10 level when N=46. When TMIS is regressed on time, the resulting equation is: TMIS=15 . 783+ 0 . 127 Time, adjusted R 2 =0 . 3%.
16 Neither the F-test for the entire regression nor the t-test for the regression coefficient of 0 . 127 are significant at the p<0 . 10 level when N=46. These results indicate that there is no overall time dependent trend, either positive or negative, in the TMIS values plotted in Figure 1 across all 46 years. However, while it may not be immediately apparent because of the exceptional years of 1966 (when TMIS reached 47) and 1991 (when TMIS was 38), there is a rough curvilinear trend in TMIS over time. That is, between 1956 and 1975 when TMIS reached 34 -a score not to be exceeded again except for 1991 -the index increased both over time and along with the number of independent African states, which increased from three in 1956 to 42 by the end of 1975. Ignoring the exceptional year of 1991, from 1976 to 2001 TMIS appears to slope downward while 26 more years passed and the number of independent, majority-ruled SSA states increased to 48 by 1994. Number of independent states Annual TMIS
A F R I C A N M I L I T A R Y C O U P S D'É T A T, 1956-2001
This ' eyeball' impression is confirmed by regression analysis. When we divide the time period into two -1958-75 and 1976-2001 -and One should be cautious about reading too much into such statistical analyses. What can be safely said is that once begun in 1958, the level of African military interventions has varied from year to year, with most years having a significant amount of coup activity (as previously noted, every year from 1958 on has seen at least one coup or failed coup attempt). Despite the exceptional years of 1966 and 1991, there is also an increasing trend to around 1975 (which 1966 supports) and a decreasing trend thereafter (which is weakened but not contradicted by 1991).
These findings also suggest that TMIS is a useful measure of PI in Africa when the research question addresses variation in TMIS among SSA states and the possible causes of TMIS (as in Jackman 1978; Jenkins & Kposowa 1990 , 1992 McGowan & Johnson 1984 , 1986 or its consequences (as in Fosu 1992 Fosu , 2002a Fosu , 2002b Wang 1998) across states. When the research question addresses variation over time in the rate of coup behaviour, TMIS is possibly not as useful as studying the timing of individual events such as failed and successful coups as is done in event history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 1997; Lunde 1991 ; Strang 1990) .
If all African states are equally prone to coup behaviour, TMIS should increase over time in tandem with or lagging somewhat behind the increasing number of independent states in SSA. This is what we find. When annual TMIS is regressed on the number of independent SSA states in a given year, the resulting equation is: TMIS=4 . 653+0 . 374 states, adjusted R 2 =17 . 8%. Both the entire regression as measured by the F-test and the regression coefficient of 0 . 374 as measured by the t-test are significant at the p<0 . 01 level, when N=46. As we have seen, a close examination of Figure 1 shows that between 1956 and 1975 TMIS steadily increased as the number of independent African states increased from three in 1956 to 42 by the end of 1975. After 1975 TMIS tended to lessen while independent states increased from 43 in 1976 to 48 in 1994, and this fact makes the relationship between annual TMIS and the number of independent SSA states a weak, albeit significant, one. Lunde's (1991 : 24-5 ) event history analysis of failed and successful African coups between 1955 and 1985 suggests why TMIS tends to increase with the number of newly independent states. He found that the probability of coups and attempts rises sharply for the first 45 months after independence and following every subsequent regime change. If a military or civilian regime can survive this testing three to four years, the risk of a coup or coup attempt declines afterwards. This is consistent with what we see in Figure 1 : TMIS increases sharply until the mid-1970s when most SSA states had become independent, and then moderately declines.
As Appendix A reports, 25 (59 . 5%) out of these 42 fragile, post-colonial states experienced failed or successful coups from their independence to the end of 1975. This suggests that country-specific factors such as the extent of civilian control of the military (Goldsworthy 1981) , conditions within African militaries such as the degree of factionalism (Decalo 1989; Gutteridge 1967) or political institutionalisation, particularly institutionalised democracy (Huntington 1968; Lunde 1991) affect the frequency and location of coup events over time. Moreover, if global conditions such as the ending of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 or the collapse of commodity prices in the mid-1980s are major influences on coup activity, this too is not evident in Figure 1 .
G E O G R A P H I C A L D I S T R I B U T I O N
In Figure 2 , we show the location of all 188 failed and successful coups in Africa's five major regions.
17 With 16 states, West Africa has one-third of all independent SSA states, yet with 85 failed and successful coups out of 188 (45 . 2%), it has been the African region most prone to PI. All of the 16 states in this region apart from Senegal have experienced from one to six (Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria) successful coups and all have had at least one failed coup attempt. As Appendix C shows, much of this activity occurred in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Benin, Nigeria and Burkina Faso. To the extent that coup contagion exists in SSA, it would appear strongest in West Africa. With the failed coup on 19 September 2002 and the ensuing civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, the West African region remains the centre of military-led PI in Africa.
North-eastern Africa with 10 states (21%) has seen 53 failed and successful coups (28 . 2%) between 1958 and 2001. Most of this activity has been located in the Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia. As with West Africa, the occurrence of attempted and successful coups is proportionately higher than the number of states in this region.
The other three regions of Central Africa, the Indian Ocean and Southern Africa have all seen coup behaviour, but proportionately less than the number of states in each region. In Central Africa the CAR, Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC have seen the most PI. The Comoros in particular and Madagascar contribute most to the Indian Ocean region's total. In Southern Africa with 10 states, only Lesotho and Swaziland have experienced successful military-led coups, and this is therefore the region with proportionately the least PI activity.
18 Between 1956 and 1994 the region was dominated by apartheid South Africa, which engineered the January 1986 military coup in Lesotho. The South African threat and long civil wars in Angola and Mozambique may have kept the militaries in independent Southern Africa focused on their more traditional duties rather than intervening politically.
:
: :
Military-led PI in SSA has been so pervasive across African countries and over time, and its consequences so negative for human and economic development on the continent, that a major topic for research must be to investigate what conditions and policies lessen or eliminate coup behaviour (for early efforts of this type, see Goldsworthy 1981; Pachter 1982) . In this regard it is interesting to note that since January 1990 more than one-half (27) of all SSA states have been free of coup attempts and successful coups. These states are listed in Table 3 . Following Decalo (1989) , there is no single reason for the absence of coups and attempts among these states. Several of them (Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal) have been coup free at least in part because France guaranteed their stability until the late 1990s (Renou 2002) . In others, the military has been bought off by sharing in the spoils of the regime (Kenya, Mauritania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe). Seven states saw no coup behaviour at least in part because they were preoccupied with other, more extreme forms of political violence: civil wars in Angola, Congo, Rwanda and Uganda; warlordism in Somalia; and interstate war in Eritrea and Ethiopia. This points to the fact that coups are only one type of PI in SSA, and that other forms of large-scale political violence have become widespread in postCold War Africa.
But the most positive reason is that some regimes have been ' able to develop a measure of systemic legitimacy that serves to discourage praetorian assaults from their armed forces ' (Decalo 1989: 575) . These are the T A B L E 3 States without serious military intervention events since 01. 01.1990 States with plots only Malawi* (2) Equatorial Guinea** (1) Mauritania** (1) Mozambique* (1) States with no intervention events Angola Madagascar** Botswana* Mauritius* Burkina Faso* Namibia* Cameroon** Rwanda Cape Verde* Senegal* Congo, Brazzaville Seychelles* Eritrea Somalia Ethiopia** South Africa*# Gabon** Swaziland Ghana* Tanzania* Kenya** Uganda Zimbabwe** Notes and Sources: * States that began the 1990s with a functioning multiparty democratic system or made a transition to such a system between 1990 and 2001 as reported in Ramsay (2001) and Esterhuysen (2002: 86-9 ). ** States that held regular elections in the 1990s, but of a questionable democratic character as reported in Ramsay (2001) and Esterhuysen (2002 : 86-9 states that entered the 1990s with a functioning multiparty democratic system (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal) or that made the transition to such a system in the 1990s (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania). Although twenty of these states held regular elections between 1990 and 2001, in at least eight countries these elections were not entirely free and fair, as happened in Zimbabwe's 2000 (legislative) and 2002 (presidential) elections. Nevertheless, in 12 states functioning multiparty democratic political systems existed in 1990 or were established subsequently. Since 1989, 33 out of SSA's 48 states have held 71 multiparty elections (Esterhuysen 2002: 77), so multiparty constitutions and regular elections are no guarantee against coup behaviour. Table 3 does suggest, however, that the duration and quality of multiparty electoral democracy is one of the factors that reduces the likelihood of military-led PI.
This conclusion is not a tautology. All independent SSA states are at risk of experiencing a coup attempt at any time. A priori this risk can be said to be equal for all states. Some factors increase this risk, such as a history of attempted and successful coups. Other factors appear to lessen this risk ; institutionalised democracy being one of the most important (Huntington 1968) . Nevertheless, even well-established democracies in Africa and elsewhere have some risk of experiencing a coup.
With international supervision, Angola had a decent election in 1992, but when Jonas Savimbi lost he went back into the bush and the civil war resumed. With his death in February 2002 and the ensuing ceasefire between the MPLA government and UNITA, domestic and international pressures may nudge Angola toward electoral democracy. The Congo and Rwanda have non-elected governments that came to power by winning civil wars. Eritrea and Uganda operate no-party systems of personal rule by President Afewerki and President Museveni. Somalia is a classic African collapsed state and has no national government. Swaziland is a traditional monarchy whose parliamentary constitution was abolished by a military-supported, palace coup in 1973.
Research on the causes of coups across countries and over time is needed, particularly if it can identify causal variables that can be modified by the policies of African governments, the new African Union and NEPAD with its peer review mechanism, aid donors and international financial institutions, in order to reduce coup behaviour by African militaries. The data set presented in this article is intended to promote such research.
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Policies that foster institutionalised, multiparty democracy and strong, elected civilian control of the military throughout Africa must be identified if SSA is to begin to overcome its current crisis. One must agree with Luckham's (1994 : 65) conclusion in his impressive survey of the political role of the armed forces in Africa ' the search must continue for ways of bringing them under effective democratic and not merely civilian control'.
N O T E S 1. In this article Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa will be used interchangeably. 2. Senegal did experience a bloodless failed coup in December 1962 resulting from an ideological and policy dispute between prime minister Mamadou Dia and President Leopold Senghor, but has seen no military intervention activity of any kind since then.
3. Such as United States support for the 1965 coup d'état that brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power, and subsequently for his regime in Zaire.
4. Rent-seeking distortions of African economies by the military in power can take various forms, as Fosu (2002b: 17) notes: '… increased expenditures on programmes that are disproportionately preferred by the elite, including the military budget and spending on tertiary education, rather than on primary school and general literacy programmes that benefit the population at large ; tax policy that favours the elite, including subsidies for urban dwellers, either directly or implicitly in the form of an overvalued domestic currency that subsidizes imports predominantly consumed in urban areas, while taxing exports produced primarily by non-urban dwellers as in the case of primary exports; and maintaining controls such as foreign exchange that perpetuates the privilege of the elite through their enforcement, including the use of bribery'. Mkandawire (2001 : 299-303) , however, questions the role of rent seeking as a cause of Africa's crisis.
5. The major exceptions are three coups in Haiti in June and September 1988 and September 1991, and General Pervez Musharraf 's October 1999 coup in Pakistan.
6. A second edition of their work updating their event file through December 1979 appeared in 1989 .
7. After 1985 the number of SSA states increased from 45 to 48 with the independence of Namibia (1990) and Eritrea (1993) and the achievement of democratic rule in South Africa (1994).
8. Professor Wang most helpfully shared his research materials with us in this effort. 9. In our data file each SSA state is also identified by a three-digit numerical code taken from Russett et al. 1968 , hence the 437 code for Côte d'Ivoire.
10. With an F statistic of 17 . 28, the total regression is significant at the p<0 . 001 level, and with a t statistic of 4 . 16, the regression coefficient of 0 . 97 is also significant at the p<0 . 001 level. The constant of x17 . 06 is not significant at the p<0 . 05 level. We report these descriptive statistics for readers' information. Our data are not drawn from a probability sample, and therefore normal inferential statistics are not appropriate.
11. Since the first observed intervention event of any kind in our data file was the successful coup d'état in the Sudan on November 17, 1958, the years 1956 and 1957 saw no reported military interventions among the then independent SSA states -Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Sudan. Hence, Tables 2 and 3 are identical in that they both actually cover 22 years of intervention behaviour. 1956 and 1957 are also unique in that they are the only years between 1956 and 2001 without military intervention events of any kind.
12. The alternative hypothesis that PI in the period 1958 to 1979 is one of the main causes of the African crisis in the second period of 1980-2001 will be investigated in subsequent research.
13. This indicates that the distribution of TMIS in the first period is more positively skewed towards high scoring states than in 1980-2001. 14. 
EVENT coup DATE 24.12.1999 Description : On Thursday soldiers began looting, hijacking cars, and set up military checkpoints in Abidjan, the capital. They announced an all-night curfew, and that anyone in the streets later than 18:00 would be shot. In addition, they freed prisoners from the opposition party, and in the process 6,500 others managed to escape. On Friday, General Robert Guei declared military control, suspended the Constitution, Courts and Parliament, thereby effectively overthrowing President Henri Konan Bedie. It was not clear whether Gen. Guei himself put the mutinous soldiers up to the task, or whether he just seized advantage of the situation when it became clear the government was no longer in control. Over the next few days Guei consolidated his power. Army and police forces supported him, as well as some government ministers. Guei appointed nine senior officers to a Committee of National Salvation to oversee the country and named himself as President of the Committee. Guei promised the restoration of 'genuine democracy' after a transition period. Elections had been scheduled for the following October, but Guei gave no immediate indication that they would still take place. The coup was 'relatively bloodless'. Participants : General Guei, rebellious soldiers and the army and police. Apparent causes: Recent economic and political instability seem to have been a factor. The European Union and IMF had recently suspended aid because of alleged corruption, and the world prices of cocoa and coffee had dropped. Politically, a lot of turmoil surrounds the upcoming presidential election. Bedie's Democratic Party tried to prevent Alassane Ouattara from running, and the government had jailed several leaders of the Republican Party. Troops began looting in protest of unpaid salaries, poor living conditions, and 'bad governance'. The unpaid salary complaint stems back to troops who served with a UN peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic, and allegedly never were compensated for their service. They also demanded the release from jail of eleven opposition party members. Sources: Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, The Toronto Star, Sunday, December 26, 1999, 454 words; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Sunday, December 26, 1999, 527 words; The New York Times, Monday, December 27, 1999, p. A10; The Guardian (London), Monday, December 27, 1999, p. 13 ; Esterhuysen (2002 : 75) .
EVENT attempted coup DATE 18.09.2000 Description : Unidentified gunmen attacked the residence of General and President Robert Guei, killing two bodyguards. Guei claimed it was an assassination attempt. Shooting began about 2:00 Monday morning and automatic weapons and mortars were heard. At least 26 persons, including six military officers, were arrested Monday and Tuesday; most of the soldiers arrested were from the Presidential Guard. Among those accused are General Lansana Palenfo, the former number two military man, and General Abdoulaye Coulibaly. Arms and incriminating evidence were found in Palenfo's home. Guei called the attackers a 'small group' of opposition supporters. Members of Ouattara's Republican Party denied involvement, saying they are always used as scapegoats. On Tuesday the city was calm, but soldiers guarded TV stations, the presidential building and Guei's residence. Participants : Twenty-six persons, including six military officers including Generals Palenfo and Coulibaly. Members of the Republican Party were accused of involvement in the attempt, but denied it. Apparent causes: Elements of the armed forces were not happy with Guei. In July, some soldiers rebelled demanding compensation for their role in last December's successful coup. The army's chief-of-staff, Brigadier-General Robert Guei, said that mutinous soldiers were planning to overthrow President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, but had been foiled in the eleventh hour. Guei reported that they were caught 'red-handed' and were already distributing cartridges to go into action. Twenty enlisted men were arrested and interrogated at an army base outside Abidjan, the capital. The highest ranked among them was a sergeant. The paper La Voie also reported that two men died in detention. Guei did not detail the causes of the plot or the objectives of the soldiers. However, the alleged plot is broadly linked to assaults by the military on a school campus on 18 May, economic problems, and a ban on a multiparty state. Guei, who is close to President Houphouet-Boigny, also hinted that the plot was orchestrated by disgruntled civilians. Diplomats interpreted this as an attempt to discredit Laurent Gbagbo, the leader of the Popular Front and the only challenger in last October's presidential election. Participants : Some twenty unnamed Army enlisted men. Apparent causes : Political unrest, dissatisfaction, and the Boigny Government's alleged corruption. In addition, a huge drop in prices of cocoa and coffee, the country's main exports, led to massive street demonstrations. Sources: Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, The Toronto Star, Wednesday, 31 July, 1991, p. A17 ; The Independent (London), Wednesday, 31 July, 1991, p. 9 ; The Associated Press, Tuesday, 30 July, 1991, 325 words.
(Continued overleaf … 
A P P E N D I X C T O T A L M I L I T A R Y I N T E R V E N T I O N S C O R E S (T M I S) A N D E V E N T S F O R A L L S U B-S A H A R A N A F R I C A N S T A T E S

T O T A L M I L I T A R Y I N T E R V E N T I O N S C O R E S (T M I S) A N D E V E N T S F O R A L L S U B-S A H A R A N A F R I C A N S T A T E S
